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LAST CALL: ACCORDING FIRST-FILED QUI 
TAM COMPLAINTS GREATER PRECLUSIVE 
EFFECT UNDER BATISTE’S NARROW 
INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST-TO-FILE 
RULE 
Abstract: On November 4, 2011, in United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the False Claims 
Act’s “first-to-file” bar does not require that a first-filed complaint plead al-
legations of fraud with particularity to bar subsequent complaints alleging 
the same material elements of fraud. In so doing, the D.C. Circuit created 
a circuit split with the Sixth Circuit regarding the pleading standards re-
quired by the first-to-file rule. This Comment argues that the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s interpretation better comports with the first-to-file rule’s twin poli-
cies of encouraging parties to promptly alert the government of fraud 
and of discouraging parasitic complaints that merely allege the same ma-
terial elements of fraud as earlier-filed complaints. This Comment further 
argues that future courts should follow the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of 
the pleading standards required by the first-to-file rule. 
Introduction 
 In 2011, the United States recovered over $3 billion in settlements 
and judgments from fraudulent claims.1 Congress passed the False 
Claims Act to prevent the submission of fraudulent or false claims for 
payment to the U.S. government.2 The Act encourages whistleblowing 
                                                                                                                      
1 Fraud Statistics—Overview, October 1, 1987—September 30, 2012, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf. 
Examples of fraudulent claims against the government include welfare fraud, Medicare 
fraud, false claims submitted by government contractors for government funding, fraudulent 
applications for government loans, and many others. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted 
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274. 
2 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (prohibiting a person or entity 
from knowingly presenting or causing to be presented to the U.S. government a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval); S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266; see also Christopher M. Alexion, Note, Open the Door, Not the Flood-
gates: Controlling Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 365, 
369 (2012) (stating that the False Claims Act is the government’s primary means of appre-
hending companies that submit false claims for payment). 
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as a means of putting the U.S. government on notice of fraud.3 To ac-
complish this goal, the False Claims Act contains qui tam provisions 
that allow “whistleblowers” to file complaints under seal on behalf of 
the U.S. government.4 The government may then intervene in the ac-
tion and prosecute the claim.5 If it does not intervene, however, the 
plaintiff may prosecute the action as long as jurisdiction is proper.6 In 
either instance, the plaintiff shares in the recovery.7  
 For a qui tam plaintiff to recover, the False Claims Act’s “first-to-
file” rule requires that the plaintiff be the first to bring an action based 
on a specific set of underlying facts.8 Whether a plaintiff is the first to 
allege a claim based on a set of underlying facts depends on the court’s 
interpretation of the first-to-file rule.9 In November 2011, in United 
States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit held that a relator’s qui tam complaint was barred by an earlier 
complaint under the first-to-file rule.10 The D.C. Circuit further held 
that a first-filed complaint does not have to meet the heightened plead-
ing requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to bar subse-
                                                                                                                      
3 See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp. (Batiste II ), 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 
2001); S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266. 
4 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). The Latin term qui tam is a short version of a longer phrase 
that translates to “who as well sues for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1368 (9th ed. 2009). Under the False Claims Act, a qui tam action filed 
under seal is “for the judge’s eyes only,” and the defendant does not get notice of the 
complaint for at least sixty days. Keith D. Barber et al., Prolific Plaintiffs or Rabid Relators? 
Recent Developments in False Claims Act Litigation, 1 Ind. Health L. Rev. 131, 138 (2004). 
5 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). A copy of the complaint and “substantially all material evi-
dence and information” must be served on the government by the person filing the com-
plaint. Id. The government may elect to intervene and may proceed with the action within 
60 days of being served with the complaint and relevant evidence. Id. 
6 Id. § 3730(b)(5), (c)(3); United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp. (Batiste I ), 740 F. 
Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2010). 
7 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). If the government proceeds with the action, the person who 
filed the complaint will receive at least 15%, but not more than 25%, of the recovery. Id. 
§ 3730(d)(1). If the government declines to proceed with the action, the person who filed 
the qui tam complaint has the right to conduct the action and will receive no less than 
25% and no more than 30% of any recovery. Id. § 3730(d)(2). 
8 Id. § 3730(b)(5). The first-to-file rule provides that when a person brings an action 
under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, no person other than the govern-
ment may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending 
action. Id. 
9 See Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1204, 1205–06; United States ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 2005). 
10 659 F.3d at 1205–06. 
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quent complaints.11 In so doing, the D.C. Circuit created a circuit split 
with the Sixth Circuit.12 
 Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the factual back-
ground and procedure of Batiste and discusses the previously filed qui 
tam complaint that barred the Batiste action under the first-to-file rule.13 
Part II examines and discusses the different interpretations of the first-
to-file rule’s pleading standards adopted by the D.C. Circuit and Sixth 
Circuit.14 Finally, Part III argues that the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation is 
preferable to that of the Sixth Circuit because it better promotes the 
policies underlying the first-to-file rule.15 
I. Overlapping Allegations of Fraud and the First-to-File Rule 
 Section A of this Part describes the plaintiff’s allegations in Ba-
tiste.16 Then, Section B details another plaintiff’s complaint in an earlier 
action filed in 2005 and explains how this complaint barred the plain-
tiff’s action in Batiste under the first-to-file rule.17 
A. Batiste’s Qui Tam Complaint Alleging Fraudulent Activity  
 In Batiste, the plaintiff, Sheldon Batiste, filed a qui tam complaint 
on June 13, 2008, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia.18 In the complaint, Batiste alleged that the defendant, SLM Corp. 
(“Sallie Mae”), defrauded the U.S. government by presenting fraudu-
                                                                                                                      
11 Id. at 1206. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires a party alleging fraud to 
“state with particularity” the circumstances constituting fraud. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Malice, 
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally. Id. 
Such requirements for fraud allegations constitute a more stringent pleading standard 
than the “short and plain statement” required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). 
Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring that allegations of fraud be stated with particulari-
ty), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring a pleading to contain a short and plain statement of 
the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction and a short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing the pleader is entitled to relief). See generally Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and 
Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1451 (2010) (examining the 
different pleading standards required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
12 Compare Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1205–06 (holding that a first-filed complaint does not 
need to meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to 
bar later filed complaints), with Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972 (holding that a first-filed com-
plaint must meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s pleading requirements to bar later 
filed qui tam complaints). 
13 See infra notes 16–43 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 44–90 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 91–111 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 18–32 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 33–43 and accompanying text. 
18 See Batiste I, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 100. 
164 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54: E. Supp. 
lent claims for government funds.19 Batiste worked as a senior loan asso-
ciate at SLM Financial Corporation, a subsidiary of Sallie Mae, from 
September 2004 through April 2006.20 Sallie Mae administered federally 
guaranteed student loans under the Federal Family Education Loan 
Program.21 Batiste alleged that Sallie Mae defrauded the U.S. govern-
ment by presenting claims for government funds and falsely certifying 
that these claims were correct and in compliance with federal law.22  
 Batiste alleged that Sallie Mae perpetrated this fraud through its 
administration of federally guaranteed student loans.23 The complaint 
stated that Sallie Mae unlawfully put such loans into forbearance in vio-
lation of the Higher Education Act’s forbearance regulations.24 By put-
ting the loans into forbearance, Sallie Mae allowed borrowers to cease 
payments temporarily, make payments over an extended period of 
time, or make smaller payments than the scheduled amount.25 Batiste’s 
complaint alleged that Sallie Mae granted forbearances to borrowers 
who made payments to bring their accounts current; this violated regu-
lations requiring lenders to grant forbearances only when borrowers 
intend to pay their loans, but cannot afford to.26 Additionally, Batiste’s 
complaint alleged that Sallie Mae incentivized loan officers to improp-
erly grant forbearances by giving bonuses to officers who reduced de-
linquencies.27 
 By granting these forbearances, Batiste’s complaint alleged, Sallie 
Mae profited.28 Interest continued to accrue on the loans while they 
were in forbearance.29 Additionally, the Department of Education con-
tinued to pay special allowances to Sallie Mae while the loans were in 
                                                                                                                      





24 Id. Under 34 C.F.R. § 682.211, forbearance is defined as “permitting the temporary 
cessation of payments, allowing an extension of time for making payments, or temporarily 
accepting smaller payments than previously were scheduled.” 34 C.F.R. § 682.211(a)(1) 
(2012). To grant a forbearance, one of two threshold conditions must be met: (1) a lender 
must reasonably believe that a borrower intends to repay the loan, but cannot due to poor 
health or other acceptable reasons, or (2) the borrower’s payments of principal are de-
ferred under § 682.210 and the Secretary of Education does not pay interest payments on 
behalf of the borrower. Id. § 682.211(a)(2). The lender and borrower must agree to the 
terms of the forbearance. Id. § 682.211(b)(1). 
25 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1206. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1207. 
28 See id. at 1206–07. 
29 Id. at 1206. 
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forbearance, thus increasing Sallie Mae’s return on each loan.30 Finally, 
Sallie Mae delayed defaulting the loan while it was in forbearance.31 This 
allegedly kept Sallie Mae’s default rate low and helped Sallie Mae qualify 
as an eligible lender under U.S. Department of Education guidelines.32 
B. The District Court’s Determination That an Earlier Complaint  
Barred Batiste’s Action 
  The district court dismissed Batiste’s action pursuant to the False 
Claims Act’s first-to-file rule.33 This rule stipulates that when a person 
brings a qui tam action, no one other than the U.S. government “may 
intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the 
pending action.”34 If the plaintiff cannot fulfill the False Claims Act’s 
first-to-file requirement, a court does not have the power to hear the 
action.35 Thus, the first-to-file rule blocks a qui tam plaintiff’s ability to 
proceed on the basis of subject matter jurisdiction.36 
 Specifically, the district court dismissed Batiste’s action on the 
grounds that the complaint was barred by a complaint filed in the U.S. 
District Court of the Central District of California over two years earlier 
in the 2005 case United States ex rel. Zahara v. SLM Corp.37 The plaintiff in 
that case (Michael Zahara), like Batiste, was a former employee of a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Sallie Mae who alleged that Sallie Mae per-
petrated a scheme to defraud the U.S. government.38 Under that 
scheme, Zahara alleged, Sallie Mae allowed its employees and agents to 
falsify forbearance records and delinquent loan records, and to repre-
sent that borrowers orally agreed to forbearances when the borrowers 
                                                                                                                      
30 Id. 
31 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1206. 
32 Id. 
33 Batiste I, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 105; see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 
34 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); Batiste I, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 102. 
35 See Batiste I, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 101. 
36 Id. (citing United States ex rel. Ervin & Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton Sec. Grp., Inc., 332 
F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
37 Id. at 102–04; see United States ex rel. Zahara v. SLM Corp., No. 2:05-cv-8020 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 9, 2005) (transferred to the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of Indi-
ana). The Zahara complaint was ultimately dismissed by the U.S. District Court of the 
Southern District of Indiana (the court to which the case had been transferred) when the 
plaintiff could not obtain counsel by the court’s deadline. See Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1207; 
United States ex rel. Zahara v. SLM Corp., No. 1:06-cv-088 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 2009). The 
Batiste complaint was filed on June 13, 2008. Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1206. Because the Zahara 
complaint was not dismissed until March 12, 2009, it was still pending when the Batiste 
complaint was filed. See Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
38 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1207. 
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never spoke to company representatives.39 Zahara’s complaint further 
alleged that Sallie Mae encouraged such forbearance fabrications by 
imposing a quota system and bonus system, whereby employees would 
receive bonuses based on performance in bringing loans current.40 Ac-
cording to the complaint, Sallie Mae perpetrated this scheme to in-
crease its revenue and maintain its “Exceptional Performer” designa-
tion, which allowed the corporation to receive higher guarantee 
payments on its defaulted loans under the Higher Education Act.41  
 Batiste appealed the district court’s dismissal of his action, claiming 
that his complaint and Zahara’s complaint alleged different fraudulent 
schemes, and that a first-filed complaint must meet a heightened plead-
ing standard to bar subsequent complaints under the first-to-file rule.42 
In support of his appeal, Batiste argued that the Zahara complaint did 
not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) be-
cause it did not plead the allegations of fraud with particularity.43 
II. Issues Surrounding the First-to-File Rule: The Same 
Material Elements Requirement and Competing  
Interpretations of the Requisite Pleading Standard 
 On appeal, two primary issues confronted the D.C. Circuit in Ba-
tiste.44 First, what constitutes a “related action based on the facts under-
lying the pending action” for the purposes of the first-to-file rule?45 Se-
cond, must a first-filed complaint satisfy the heightened pleading 
requirement of Federal Rule of Procedure 9(b) to bar later-filed 
                                                                                                                      
39 Id. These falsifications and misrepresentations violated the Higher Education Act’s 
forbearance regulations. See id. at 1206–07; see also supra note 24 (providing an overview of 
the Higher Education Act’s forbearance regulations). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. A lender could achieve the “Exceptional Performer” designation by receiving a 
high “compliance performance rating” as determined by a lender’s compliance with the 
Department of Education’s due diligence requirements. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078-9(a)(1) (2006) 
(repealed 2007). When an exceptional performer submitted claims for payment to a guaran-
ty agency, it was entitled to receive 99% of the unpaid principal and interest on loans that 
were the subject of the claims. Id. § 1078-9(b)(1). Without the “exceptional performer” des-
ignation, the lender would receive either 97% or 98% of the unpaid principal depending on 
when the loan was first disbursed. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b)(1)(G) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
There is no longer an “exceptional performance” designation under the Higher Education 
Act. See id. § 1078. 
42 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1208. 
43 Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
44 United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp. (Batiste II ), 659 F.3d 1204, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). 
45 See id. 
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claims?46 Section A of this Part examines how the D.C. Circuit applied 
the same material elements test to decide that the Batiste action was a 
“related action” based on the facts underlying United States ex rel. Zahara 
v. SLM Corp., which was filed in the U.S. District Court of the Central 
District of California in 2005.47 Then, Section B explores the split be-
tween the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit over whether a first-filed 
complaint must meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civ-
il Procedure 9(b) to preclude subsequent complaints.48 
A. Application of the Same Material Elements Requirement 
 The D.C. Circuit first evaluated what is considered a “related ac-
tion based on the facts underlying” an earlier filed action.49 In making 
this determination, courts have held that the first-to-file rule bars com-
plaints alleging the same material elements of fraud.50 The court in Ba-
tiste referred to this test as the “Hampton material facts test.”51 In addi-
tion to considering whether a later-filed complaint alleges the same 
material elements of fraud, courts may also consider whether a later-
filed claim would give rise to a separate investigation or recovery by the 
government.52 From a policy perspective, the first-to-file rule serves a 
dual purpose: (1) rejecting suits that the government already has notice 
of, and (2) promoting those suits that the government is not equipped 
to deal with on its own.53 Thus, a first-filed claim notifies the govern-
                                                                                                                      
46 See id. 
47 See infra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 61–90 and accompanying text. 
49 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1208–10. 
50 See, e.g., Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1208 (holding that the first-to-file rule bars complaints 
when a later-filed complaint alleges the same material elements of fraud as an earlier com-
plaint); United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 
217 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the first-to-file rule bars complaints alleging the same 
material elements of fraud as a prior complaint); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Air-
craft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the first-to-file rule requires 
a complaint to allege the same material elements of fraud, rather than identical facts, to 
bar later-filed complaints). 
51 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1209. In 2003, in United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA 
Healthcare Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that two complaints do 
not need to allege identical facts for the first-filed claim to bar a subsequent claim. See 318 
F.3d at 217–18. Rather, a later-filed complaint only needs to allege the “same material ele-
ments” to be barred by a first-filed complaint. See id. 
52 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1209–10 (citing United States ex rel. Ortega v. Columbia 
Healthcare, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
53 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Hampton, 318 F.3d at 217); United States ex rel. 
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 650–51 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (analyzing the 
1986 amendments to the False Claims Act and concluding that they left significant barriers 
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ment of the essential facts of an alleged fraud, and the first-to-file rule 
bars repetitive claims and discourages opportunistic behavior by bar-
ring subsequent actions based on the same alleged fraud.54 
 Comparing Zahara’s complaint with Batiste’s complaint, the D.C. 
Circuit held that, under the Hampton test, both complaints alleged the 
same material facts of fraud.55 Although Zahara and Batiste worked for 
different Sallie Mae subsidiaries, both alleged that the same fraudulent 
activities occurred at their respective offices and that Sallie Mae’s poli-
cies promoted the fraudulent behavior.56 The court determined that if 
the government investigated the facts alleged in Zahara’s complaint on 
a nationwide basis, it would have discovered fraud at both offices.57 Fur-
thermore, the additional allegations in Batiste’s complaint would not 
have led to a different investigation or recovery by the government.58 
Therefore, Batiste’s complaint was barred by the Zahara complaint un-
der the first-to-file rule.59 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.60 
B. Disagreement over Whether a Plaintiff Must Plead with Particularity to 
Preclude Later-Filed Complaints  
 Next, the D.C. Circuit considered which pleading standard a qui 
tam plaintiff must meet to bar subsequent complaints under the first-to-
file rule.61 Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that a party alleging fraud must state the fraudulent circumstances with 
particularity.62 This is a heightened standard from Rule 8 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a “short and plain statement” 
of the claim.63 Requiring that a qui tam complaint under the False 
                                                                                                                      
to parasitic suits); S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1–2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 
5266–67. 
54 United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp. (Batiste I ), 740 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 
2010) (quoting Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1187). The rationale behind this policy is to encourage a 
whistleblower with valuable information to come forward, while discouraging “parasitic” 
plaintiffs from recovering damages as a result of previously disclosed fraud. See United 
States ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 
United States ex rel. Jones v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 160 F.3d 326, 335 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
55 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1209. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1210. 
59 See id. at 1209–10. 
60 Id. at 1211. 
61 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
62 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
63 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
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Claim Act meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), howev-
er, would create an exception to the first-to-file rule’s bar on all subse-
quent complaints alleging the same material elements of fraud.64 Con-
sequently, the D.C. Circuit held that a first-filed complaint does not 
need to meet the pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) to bar later-filed 
complaints under the first-to-file rule.65 In so doing, the D.C. Circuit 
created a circuit split with the Sixth Circuit.66 
 In 2005, in United States ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a False Claims Act 
qui tam complaint must meet the pleading requirements of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to preclude a subsequent complaint.67 
The complaint in that case alleged that Lockheed Martin, a company 
engaged in uranium enrichment, conducted fraudulent activities to 
maintain its Department of Energy accreditation.68 The district court 
held that the first-to-file rule barred the complaint because a complaint 
filed one month earlier in United States ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp. encompassed Walburn’s allegations.69 
 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and created 
an exception to the first-to-file rule for complaints that do not meet the 
pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).70 The court 
determined that the “vague and broad-ranging” allegations contained 
in the Brooks complaint encompassed the Walburn complaint’s more 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973. 
65 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
66 Compare Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210 (holding that a first-filed complaint does not 
need to meet the heightened requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) because 
a complaint that is not specific enough to meet the heightened standard could still put the 
government on notice of fraudulent activity), with Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972–73 (holding 
that a first-filed complaint under the False Claims Act must meet the heightened pleading 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to bar subsequent complaints be-
cause a detailed pleading is necessary to put the government on notice of fraud). 
67 See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972–73. 
68 Id. at 969. The alleged fraudulent activities included concealing and changing radia-
tion exposure dosage readings, which allowed Lockheed to satisfy the Department of En-
ergy’s requirements for accreditation. Id. The United States declined to intervene in the 
action; therefore, the plaintiff prosecuted the case on his own. Id. 
69 Id.; see United States ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 423 F. Supp. 2d 522, 
525 (D. Md. 2006). The Brooks complaint alleged that Lockheed “falsified, concealed and 
destroyed” documents pertaining to a plant’s operations and submitted “false records and 
statements” to the government to induce payment. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 971. The Walburn 
complaint stated more specific allegations than the Brooks complaint regarding the means 
by which Lockheed assigned uranium exposure dosage readings to employees and how it 
used the readings to fraudulently obtain Department of Energy accreditation and pay-
ments under operating agreements. See id. 
70 See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972–73. 
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detailed allegations, and therefore both complaints were related ac-
tions that alleged the same material elements of fraud.71 The Brooks 
complaint, however, did not meet the pleading requirements of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), because it did not specify the time, place, 
and nature of the alleged fraud.72 The court reasoned that the Brooks 
complaint was not specific enough to put the defendant on notice.73 
Therefore, it could not have put the government on notice of the es-
sential facts of the fraudulent scheme.74  
 As such, the Sixth Circuit recognized an exception to the first-to-
file rule.75 Although the two complaints were “related actions” alleging 
the same underlying facts, the Brooks complaint did not bar the Walburn 
complaint because it failed to meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements.76 Accord-
ingly, the court held that subject matter jurisdiction over the Walburn 
complaint was proper because the Brooks complaint was too broad to be 
protected by the first-to-file rule.77 In so holding, the court emphasized 
that this exception furthered the False Claims Act’s dual policy goals of 
encouraging whistleblowers to put the government on notice of fraud, 
while deterring plaintiffs from filing overly broad suits in an effort to 
preserve a larger recovery for themselves.78 The court elaborated that 
such overly broad suits would fail to put the government on notice of 
fraud.79 
 In contrast to the Sixth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit in Batiste held that 
a first-filed complaint does not need to meet the particularity require-
ment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to bar later-filed com-
plaints alleging the same material elements of fraud.80 Instead, a com-
plaint need only provide sufficient notice for the government to launch 
an investigation into the alleged fraudulent activities.81 In reaching this 
holding, the court relied on a textual interpretation of the first-to-file 
rule.82 Nothing in the text of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) requires that alle-
                                                                                                                      
71 Id. at 971–72. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 973. 
75 See id. 
76 See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 Id. 
80 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
81 Id. 
82 Id.; see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2006) (“When a person brings an action under this 
subsection, no person other than the [g]overnment may intervene or bring a related ac-
tion based on the facts underlying the pending action.”). 
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gations of fraud be plead with particularity to bar later-filed com-
plaints.83 It only requires that an action be “pending” to bar later-filed 
complaints alleging the same material elements of fraud.84 The court 
further reasoned that a complaint not specific enough to put a defend-
ant on notice could still provide the government with sufficient notice 
to launch an investigation into the alleged fraudulent activities.85 Addi-
tionally, the court implicitly reasoned that its approach would also 
promote the first-to-file rule’s policy goal of barring opportunistic 
plaintiffs from filing parasitic actions.86 Any subsequent complaints al-
leging the same material elements of fraud would be barred under this 
interpretation, thereby precluding the possibility of parasitic suits.87 
 The court also reasoned that requiring the first-filed complaint to 
meet the particularity standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
would create a “strange judicial dynamic.”88 In this dynamic, it would be 
possible that one district court would have to determine the sufficiency 
of a complaint filed in another district court.89 Such a scenario could 
potentially create disagreement between two district courts over a com-
plaint’s sufficiency.90 
III. The First-to-File Rule Should Not Require a First-Filed 
Complaint to Plead with Particularity 
 The D.C. Circuit’s approach in Batiste is preferable to the Sixth 
Circuit’s approach in 2005 in United States ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp.91 The D.C. Circuit’s approach better comports with the 
first-to-file rule’s policies of alerting the government to fraudulent activ-
                                                                                                                      
83 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
84 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210. A claim is considered ”pend-
ing” for the purposes of the first-to-file rule if it has not yet been dismissed when the later 
claim is filed. See Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1188. 
85 Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
86 See id. at 1210–11. The problem of “parasitic” suits filed under the False Claims Act 
arose in the 1930s. See Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure 
Under the Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 23, 24–25 
(1998). After the Supreme Court upheld a $75,000 award to a qui tam plaintiff who merely 
alleged information that the government had already obtained, the False Claims Act was 
amended in 1943 to restrict the qui tam provisions, and thereby to discourage parasitic 
suits. See id. at 24–26. The 1943 version of the False Claims Act did not prevent fraud effec-
tively, and the Act was amended in 1986 to its current form. See id. at 26–27. 
87 See Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210–11. 
88 Id. at 1210. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See infra notes 92–111 and accompanying text. 
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ities and discouraging opportunistic plaintiffs from filing parasitic 
suits.92 First, by declining to recognize an exception to the first-to-file 
rule, the Batiste court encourages plaintiffs to promptly put the gov-
ernment on notice of fraudulent activities.93 If there are no exceptions 
to the first-to-file rule, to recover anything, a plaintiff must file a com-
plaint before any other plaintiff files a complaint alleging the same ma-
terial elements of fraud.94 Otherwise, the plaintiff will be precluded by 
the earlier filed complaint.95 This creates a “race to the courthouse” 
among plaintiffs.96 As a result, a plaintiff’s complaint will likely notify 
the government of fraud—and enable the government to recover sto-
len or misused funds—earlier.97 
 Second, a no-exception interpretation of the first-to-file rule also 
promotes the policy of discouraging opportunistic plaintiffs from filing 
parasitic complaints.98 When no exceptions are recognized, the first-to-
file rule bars all subsequent, repetitive complaints.99 Conversely, if a 
Rule 9(b) pleading exception is recognized, repetitive or parasitic suits 
could still be valid even if the government has already been put on no-
tice.100 Such repetitive suits could have the effect of lessening the gov-
ernment’s recovery.101 
 Moreover, although courts have criticized a strict, no-exception 
approach to the first-to-file rule, this criticism fails to recognize Federal 
                                                                                                                      
92 See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp. (Batiste II ), 659 F.3d 1204, 1210–11 
(D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Leslie Ann Skillen & Megan M. Scheurer, Who’s on First: 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(b)(5), 44 False Claims Act & Qui Tam Q. Rev., Jan. 2007, at 69, 75–76 (arguing 
that a strict first-to-file interpretation is preferable and that there should not be an excep-
tion for first-filed complaints that do not meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements). This approach is 
preferable because it creates incentives for potential whistleblowers to alert the govern-
ment more quickly and therefore may spur quicker government investigation. See Skillen & 
Scheurer, supra, at 76. 
93 See Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210–11; United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 
243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an exception-free first-to-file rule is con-
gruent with the purposes of the rule, namely promoting whistleblowing while discouraging 
opportunistic plaintiffs). 
94 See Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
95 See id. 
96 See Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 92, at 75–76 (arguing that a strict first-to-file in-
terpretation encourages qui tam plaintiffs to file actions as quickly as possible and there-
fore allows the government to investigate and to make a recovery as quickly as possible). 
97 See id. at 76. 
98 See Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210–11; Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1187. 
99 See Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1187. 
100 See Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1210–11. 
101 See Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 92, at 76 (arguing that duplicative claims filed af-
ter the government has been put on notice would drain public funds because such claims 
would permit double recovery on the same fraud). 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s safeguards.102 A no-exception approach 
has been criticized for encouraging overly broad complaints filed by 
plaintiffs seeking to preserve any recovery for themselves.103 To bar 
subsequent complaints under the first-to-file rule, however, a first-filed 
complaint must be specific enough to allege the same material ele-
ments of fraud as the subsequent complaint.104 Otherwise, the subse-
quent complaint would not be barred.105 Furthermore, to withstand a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must also meet 
the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).106 Otherwise, 
the complaint would be dismissed and the plaintiff would not be able 
to recover.107 Thus, the same material elements requirement and Rule 
9(b) safeguard against frivolous, amorphous placeholder complaints.108 
 A strict interpretation of the first-to-file rule encourages potential 
whistleblowers to notify the government promptly, discourages oppor-
tunistic parasitic suits, and is generally not susceptible to frivolous 
placeholder complaints.109 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit’s interpreta-
tion of the pleading standards required by the first-to-file rule better 
comports with the False Claims Act’s and first-to-file rule’s policy goals 
than the approach followed by the Sixth Circuit.110 As such, future 
courts should follow the D.C. Circuit’s approach.111 
Conclusion 
 In Batiste, the D.C. Circuit held that a first-filed complaint does not 
need to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
to bar subsequent complaints. In so doing, it created a circuit split with 
the Sixth Circuit. The approach taken by the D.C. Circuit is preferable 
                                                                                                                      
102 See infra notes 103–108 and accompanying text. 
103 See United States ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 973 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (implying that a first-to-file interpretation that does not incorporate Rule 9(b)’s 
requirements would lead to overly broad complaints); Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 
F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a first-filed “sham” complaint or “place-
holder” complaint could displace a meritorious complaint under a strict interpretation of 
the first-to-file rule). 
104 See Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1208; United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA 
Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1189. 
105 See Batiste II, 659 F.3d at 1208. 
106 See id. at 1210–11. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id.; Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1187; Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 92, at 76–77. 
110 See supra notes 91–109 and accompanying text. 
111 See supra notes 91–110 and accompanying text. 
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because it better promotes the goals of promptly notifying the govern-
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